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An Empirical Examination of Economic Determinants of Financial CEO Compensation:
A Comparative Study on Pre and Post Financial Crisis Periods1

Abstract
Inadequate risk monitoring and the executive incentive system of US financial institutions
are considered to be significant factors in exacerbating the 2008 financial crisis, and regulators
attempted to reform the executive compensation system in the post-crisis period. In this study, we
conduct a comparative analysis of the economic determinants of the compensation for chief
executive officers (CEOs) between the pre- and post-financial crisis periods, using data from US
financial service institutions, since this is the sector that has been most affected by the financial
crisis. We find that the mean values of total compensation and its incentive components, including
cash bonus and long-term compensations, decreased significantly in the post-crisis period. While
the proportion of fixed salary to total compensation increased, the bonus decreased significantly
during the pre- to post-crisis period. In the pre-crisis period, total compensation was determined
by stock performance, accounting profit, long-term growth and business leverage, whereas in the
post-crisis period stock returns and leverage are the major economic factors influencing total
compensation. We also find that leverage is positively associated with total compensation and that
a firm’s leverage negatively influences the sensitivity of the pay for performance in both the preand post-crisis periods. But the influence of leverage on pay for performance is weaker in the postcrisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2011, empowered
shareholder influence on CEO pay. This encourages CEOs to focus on short-term stock returns to
satisfy the scrutiny of empowered shareholders. Disregarding other economic factors and
narrowing the focus on stock returns for determining executive compensation in the post-crisis
period might have unintended consequences, deterring firms to take wider forward-looking
approaches for their long-term sustainability.

JEL Classification: M41, M52, M55
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An Empirical Examination of Economic Determinants of Financial CEO Compensation:
A Comparative Study on Pre and Post Financial Crisis Periods

1. Introduction
In 2008 the US economy faced one of the worst financial crises since the Great Depression.
Academics argue that inadequate market discipline for financial institutions and a short-term goaloriented executive incentive system, among others contributed to excessive risk-taking by the
executives , which resulted in the biggest economic downturn in the US and global economy since
the 1930s (Bhagat and Bolton, 2014). If the poorly-aligned executive incentive is responsible for
this economic turmoil, markets should have learned valuable lessons from the crisis. The incentive
system should be redesigned, shifting its exposure away from the companies’ short-term results to
long-term sustainability. As the US economy started to trend downward, regulators and
policymakers seized the initiative to reform the managerial incentive system. As a response to the
2008’s crisis, in early 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted to regulate the executive incentive
system. The Act gave power to shareholders over executive compensation decisions.2
In this paper, we investigate whether the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 brought
any change to the executive incentive system in US financial institutions. The objective of our
study is to examine the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the
pre- and post-financial crisis period. While analyzing this relationship, we test if there is any
significant difference in the determinants of executive compensation before and after the financial
crisis. We narrow our focus to the firm-specific economic determinants of the compensation of
chief executive officers. Using data from 477 financial
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institutions and 3,575 firm-year

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, commonly referred to as Dodd-Frank Act, was
signed by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010 and enacted in early 2011.
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf
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observations, our results show that the CEO compensation composition

and its economic

determinants differ significantly between the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. While most of
the studies exclude financial institutions because of their special characteristics, regulations and
capital structure, we focus on financial institutions specifically (SIC codes from 6000 to 6799,
including financial, insurance and real estate industries) because they are the industries most
affected by and blamed for the financial crisis.
Research motivated by the 2008 financial crisis mostly examines whether the incentive
system in the financial sector encouraged excessive risk-taking and led to one of the worst
economic disasters in US history (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; DeYoung et al., 2013). These exante analyses use data from and around the crisis period. Although the ex-post scenarios after the
crisis are underexplored and still developing, our study complements this strand of literature by
conducting a comparative analysis of the pre- and post-financial crisis periods using a wider range
of data. Our data ranges from five years before to five years after the financial crisis, defined as
2003 to 2007 for the pre-crisis period, 2008 as the crisis, and 2009 to 2013 for post-crisis period.
We document that, total CEO payments, bonus, and long-term compensation shrank
notably from pre- to post-financial crisis period. This finding stirs the debate about whether the
reduction in CEO pay leads to optimal contracting or is simply window dressing. The reduced
payments in the post-crisis period seem to support the “rent extraction theory” as opposed to the
“labor market theory”. According to the “rent extraction theory”, powerful CEOs extract private
benefits in excess of optimal compensation (Hermanson, 2006; Strier, 2010; Kuhnen and Zwiebel,
2009), whereas “labor market theory” suggests that a generous incentive package is due to CEO
talent, skill and labor market demand (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007; Frydman, 2007; Graham et al.
2009). Since the labor market demand for CEO talent to manage complex modern firms has not
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changed significantly over the pre- and post-crisis periods, the reduction in compensation in the
post-crisis period seems to imply that over-payments in the pre-crisis period amount to rent
extraction.
In our study, we also find that, in the pre-crisis period, the total compensation is primarily
determined by stock performance, accounting performance, growth and company leverage,
whereas in the post-crisis period stock returns and leverage are the major factors influencing total
compensation. Particularly, we find significant positive associations between total compensation
and stock returns, accounting earnings, and leverage in the pre-crisis period. On the other hand, in
the post-crisis period, the relationships between total compensation, and stock returns and leverage
are significantly positive but there is no relationship between total compensation and accounting
income. Our study also documents that the sensitivity of pay for performance is significantly
mediated by the leverage structure of the firm. However, the role of leverage on mediating the pay
for performance sensitivity is weaker in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. This
finding warrants concerns over whether the debtholders’ interest is well protected in the incentive
system of the financial institutions in the post-crisis period.
Agency theory argues for the alignment of interests between owners and managers (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990; Roberts, 2005; Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1999). Tying executive
compensation with firm performance is considered as an effective way to ensure a better alignment
of principal (shareholders) and agent’s (managers’) interests. We find that in both pre- and postfinancial crisis periods, total compensation and stock returns are significantly and positively
associated. However, the pay for stock performance sensitivity is significantly stronger in the postcrisis period. The findings of stronger pay for performance sensitivity in the post-crisis period,
indicates a better alignment between executive incentives and shareholder interest. The Dodd-
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Frank Act has increased shareholder power and works as an incentive for firms to determine
executive compensation by focusing on stock returns. As a result, in the post-crisis period,
compensation seems to be determined for the most part by the satisfaction of the empowered
shareholders. However, the findings of our study raise the question whether the Dodd-Frank Act
places too much emphasis on stock performance and ignores many other economic factors for
optimal CEO contracting. Strengthening CEO incentives with stock returns and giving
shareholders more “Say on Pay”3 resulted in higher pay for performance sensitivity. But this may
encourage shareholders and executives to gamble with taking risky initiatives, leading in some
cases to government intervention if the bets would not pay off.
Our research is significant in the context of the US economy, the regulatory reforms of
financial institutions, and the perspectives of the executive compensations. First, although
compensation literature is mature, only a few studies to our knowledge have focused on the postcrisis compensation data, and none has compared the relationship between compensation and
firm performance over the pre- and post-crisis period. To address this gap, we analyzed the
compensation structures for these periods, as well as the determinants of compensation and the
changes in the influencing factors of total and various components of compensation. Second, by
analyzing two competing theories, “rent extraction theory” and “labor market theory,” we extend
the compensation literature. We documented significant reductions in total and incentive
components of compensation in the post-crisis period, which justifies the rent extractions of
powerful managers in the pre-crisis period, and call for further research into whether rent
extractions are partly responsible for excessive risk-taking and the economic crisis. Third, our
“Say on Pay”, a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, requires public companies to hold a non-binding shareholder
vote on the compensation of their top executives at least once every three years. The “Say on Pay” provision also
requires public companies to hold a non-binding vote at least once every six years to determine if the vote on
compensation will take place every one, two or three years.
3
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study adds new insights to the literature of financial industry, an industry usually excluded by
researchers. Our study is an explicit attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of the
compensation/performance relationship for the financial industry, which is mostly blamed for the
financial crisis and is most affected by the Dodd-Frank regulation after the crisis. Finally, the
study’s findings will be of interest to regulators, board of directors, lenders, shareholders and
managers.
2. Prior Literature
CEO incentive systems are complex and constantly debated in the literature. US CEO
payments are the highest in the world (Hermanson, 2006; Strier, 2010), and some academics argue
that generous pay packages for top executives amounts to a “rent extraction” from the firm by
powerful employees (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009). The “rent extraction
theory” posits that high compensation levels reflect the CEOs’ ability to extract private benefits in
excess of optimal compensation contract. Other researchers explain the large payments as the
result of optimal contracting because of the competitiveness of the “labor market forces” (Murphy
and Zabojnik, 2007; Frydman, 2007; Graham et al. 2009). The “labor market theory” justifies
excessive pay as a demand for skilled labor and talent to operate complex modern companies,
aligning CEO with shareholder interests.
Frydman and Jenter (2010) have divided the evolution of CEO compensation into two
periods. From the end of the Second World War to the 1970s, CEO payments were relatively low,
with moderate pay for performance sensitivities. From the late 1980s, CEO compensation levels
started to increase, and in the 1990s skyrocketed as equity incentive and stock option grants were
added as a large portion of the pay package to top executives (Hall and Liebma, 1998; Murphy,
1999; Core et al., 1999). Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) find that average compensation for top
7

executives of the S&P 500 firms increased 200% from 1993 to 2003. None of the existing theories
‒ rent extraction or labor market demand ‒ seems to explain fully the changing landscape of the
compensation pattern in last few decades.
Certainly, CEO payments became more controversial in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis. CEO compensation, especially in the financial services industry, attracted renewed media
attention. In many cases, it is clear that top executives of large banks continued to receive generous
pay packages while government rescued large firms that were about to collapse. All too often,
compensation for top executives of large financial institutions did not aligned with company
performance during and before the crisis. For example, the second largest Wall Street bonus of
2008, $39.4 million, was paid to Thomas Montag, head of sales at Merrill Lynch. However, in the
fourth quarter of 2008, the company had a net loss of $15.31 billion. Similarly, Lehman Brothers’
CEO, Richard Fuld, was paid $184 million from 2003 to 2007. During Fuld’s time as CEO,
Lehman turned into one of the riskiest players on Wall Street. Bear Stearns CEO James Cayne was
paid $163 million from 2003 to 2007, earning a $33 million bonus in 2006. To meet a minimum
threshold of ROE so that he could receive the bonus, Cayne made risky bets with company assets
on subprime mortgages.4 All of these firms failed spectacularly during the financial crisis, which
led many to believe that the high compensation of CEOs encouraged them to take high risks for
their firms. There are also concerns about whether CEOs use bailout funds to reward themselves
and give favored employees bonuses.
Many researchers argue that the compensation contract in the pre-crisis period encouraged
excessive risk-taking, which eventually threatened the global economy (DeYoung et al., 2013;
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Rajan, 2008; Chesney et al., 2011; Gande and Kalpathy, 2011; Suntheim, 2011). However, other
researchers do not support the argument that the economic downturn induced by excessive risktaking resulted from higher incentive packages in the banking industry (Fahlenbrach and Stulz,
2011; Erel et al., 2011). Some studies find no evidence that banks with risk inducing remuneration
policies performed worse during the financial crisis (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Beltratti and
Stulz, 2009). Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) claim that stock option incentives have no adverse
impact on bank performance. Conyon et al. (2010) argue that the role of the compensation system
on excessive risk-taking prior to the crisis was dwarfed by loose monetary policy, social policies,
and financial innovation.
In the early 1990s, compensation for bank CEOs was much less than for non-bank CEOs
(Smith and Watts, 1992; Houston and James, 1995). However, using data from 1994 to 2006,
Gregg et al, (2012) documents that CEO pay in the financial service sector is much higher than
that of other sectors, although the pay for performance sensitivity in the banking industry is not
significantly higher than in other industries. Core and Guay (2010) state that payments to US bank
CEOs are “neither too high nor too little” and they maintain that compensation to the financial
firms’ CEOs, in particular the big firms, has been increasingly in line with non-financial CEOs
over past decades. The compensation package of the large banks reflects the executives’ talents,
complexity of their tasks, firm superior performance and labor market demands (Core et al., 2005,
Kaplan, 2008).
3. Theoretical Development and Hypotheses
The principal-agent literature focused on the determination of the optimal contracting
between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager). According to the agency theory that
separates ownership from control, shareholders and managers have conflicting interests (Jensen
9

and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). In a complex information environment, where the owner is
unable to observe all managerial efforts, the optimal contract is to make the compensation contract
on the basis of the outcome of the manager (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Roberts, 2005). When the
compensation contract between the firm and the CEO is based on stock returns, the CEO would
more likely behave in the interests of the shareholders (Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1999).
However, the application of the agency theory in the real world is not straightforward.
The complexity of the CEO incentive contract has spurred considerable research on the
variation of the determinants of the CEO compensation. Researchers identify several factors that
influence CEO payments, which include the CEO’s specific characteristics, the firm’s economic
characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, ownership attributes, and social and political
forces (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995; Lambert et al.
1993; Graham et al., 2009; Frydman, 2007). These factors seem to affect the various components
differently, such as fixed salaries, bonuses, long-term incentives and equity incentives (Chalmers
et al., 2006). While other determinants include a wide range of elements from CEO ownership to
gender, economic determinants are clearly identified in the literature. In this study, we focus on
firm’s economic performance, both accounting profit and stock returns, as the key determinants of
CEO payments, in addition to firm-specific economic factors, such as growth, leverage and
company size reflecting the demand for skilled and talented CEOs (Rosen, 1982; Smith and Watts,
1992; Banker and Datar, 1989; Milkovich and Rabin, 1991).
3.1. Firms’ Stock Performance and Executive Compensation
In the US, compensation packages for CEOs include salary, bonus, stock grants, options and other
long-term incentives. As its name suggests, the bonus plan is designed as an incentive to increase
accounting profit, whereas equity shares and stock options are used to increase stock returns and
10

to align manager and shareholder interests. Even so, the evidence linking CEO payments and stock
performance is mixed. While many studies find no relation between compensation and
performance (Kerr and Bettis, 1987; Miller, 1995; Jeppson et al. 2009), Jensen and Murphy (1990)
detect a weak association between CEO pay and company performance, and Hall and Liebman
(1998) find a strong positive association between the two. Indeed, Nourayi and Daroca (2008) find
that firm size and stock performance positively influence CEO compensation. Similarly, Boschen
et al. (2003) find a positive and persistent relation between stock performance and CEO
compensation. Murphy (1985) argues that stock returns are more appropriate than accounting
profits for designing incentive plans. In line with previous literature, it is important to reexamine
the impact of stock returns on executive compensation in the pre- and post-financial crisis periods,
and to test whether there is any significant difference in this relationship during those periods.
Historical trends on compensation show that any rise or fall in the economy, or any
regulatory reforms, significantly influences the executive incentive system. For example, Jarque
(2008) documents that after the economic downturn in the early 2000s, executive compensations
decreased and that the composition of payment moved from fixed salary towards incentive-based
compensation. By using executive compensation data from 2000-2006, DeYoung et al. (2013) find
that in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis banks included stronger risk-taking
incentives in CEO compensation packages. Chen et al. (2015) document that the positive
relationship between company stock-market performance and executive compensation has been
stronger following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). In line with the literature, we would expect a
strong positive relationship between total compensation and company stock performance in the
pre-financial crisis period.
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Using post financial crisis data, Correa and Lel (2016) find that CEO pay declined after the
2008 crisis, and especially after Dodd–Frank in 2010. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, to give its full name, mandated several provisions for the executive
compensation system and reinforced accountability for top executives. The act improves
transparency of the incentive system by mandating: (1) “Say on Pay”, shareholders input on
compensation, (2) additional disclosures on the relation between compensation and the company’s
financial performance, and (3) checks and balances on pay by establishing new standards for
compensation-committee independence and with a ‘clawback’ provision. Correa and Lel (2016)
argue that the “Say on Pay” provision increases pay-performance sensitivity, the company’s stock
performance and compensation relationship). Thus, the act decentralizes power from the firm to
shareholders, who now have better information and a controlling influence in determining CEO
compensation packages. Therefore, we predict that in the post-financial crisis period, the
relationship between executive compensation and stock returns would be significantly positive.
Kent, Kercher and Routledge (2016) also find a stronger pay for performance sensitivity
in the post-crisis period. The authors argue that Dodd-Frank increased the independence of the
compensation committee, which results in better oversight on company performance and incentive
structure. Thus, in the post-crisis period, we would expect a stronger alignment between CEO
compensation and stock returns. From this discussion, we developed the following hypotheses
about the relation between compensation and stock returns in the pre- and post-crisis periods:
H1

(a):

CEO total compensation is positively associated with stock returns in the pre-financial

crisis period.
H1 (b): CEO total compensation is positively associated with stock returns in the post-financial
crisis period.
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H1

(c):

The association between CEO total compensation and stock returns is stronger in the

post-financial crisis period.
3.2. Firms’ Accounting Performance and Executive Compensation
In the existing literature, several authors investigate the relationship between executive
compensation and company accounting-based performance. Although accounting earnings are
considered a crude measure of company performance, and easily distorted, Meredith (1990), and
Sigler and Haley (1995) suggest that the best way to design an optimal compensation plan is to
link both accounting and market-based performance. Most research in the compensation literature
shows a strong positive relationship between executive compensation and accounting performance
(Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Defeo et al., 1989; Dechow et al., 1994). In addition, Balsam (1998)
finds that accounting performance is more exposed to bonus and salary pursuits by executives.
Boschen et al. (2003) find that the association between accounting performance and CEO
compensation is non-persistently positive.
Carter, Lynch and Zechman (2009) find that in the mid-2000s, following the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX), firms placed greater emphasis on accounting income to determine bonuses. For
the post-SOX period, Shim and Kim (2015) find that CEO compensation is strongly related to
accounting-based performance. Since SOX intended to improve the corporate governance system
and the reliability of financial reporting, firms and investors place significant weight on accounting
information as a determinant for executive compensation during 2002-2008—that is, to the eve of
the financial crisis. Therefore, we would expect a strong positive relationship between accounting
performance and compensation in the pre-crisis period.
After the crisis in 2008, several companies restructured their compensation policies, but
we would still expect the positive association to continue, and even to see a stronger relation
13

between accounting performance measures and compensation. The reasons for our positive
prediction lie with the several legal provisions that ensure and improve the reliability and
transparency of the accounting numbers after 2008. For example, Section 953 of the Dodd-Frank
Act requires company disclosures on the relationship between compensation paid and the
company’s financial performance, and Section 954 requires a clawback policy in the event of any
material financial misstatements. Thus, following the crisis, firms are expected to be more cautious
about reporting financial numbers, and particularly about linking executive compensation to
accounting performance. Therefore, we predict our second set of hypotheses as follows (in our
empirical analysis, we use returns on equity (net income divided by stockholder equity) to measure
company accounting-based performance):
H2

(a):

CEO total compensation is positively associated with returns on equity in the pre-

financial crisis period.
H2

(b):

CEO total compensation is positively associated with returns on equity in the post-

financial crisis period.
H2

(c):

The association between CEO total compensation and returns on equity is stronger in

the post-financial crisis period.
3.3. Firms’ Leverage and Executive Compensation
Berkovitch et al. (2000) argue that there is a complex relationship between managerial
compensation and capital structure. They suggest that in empirical cross-sectional studies on the
economic determinants of executive compensation, debt structure should not be used simply as a
control variable, and a few papers document a negative relation between leverage and
compensation. Houston and James (1995), for example, document that CEOs with high leveraged
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firms in the banking sector receive less cash compensation and a smaller percentage of options and
equity compensation. Because high leverage sends a negative signal to markets, it might be
interpreted as the CEO’s inefficiency and result in lower compensation. Higher leverage is also
interpreted as higher financial risk for a firm, and unwelcome from the stockholders’ perspective.
In line with the literature, we predict a negative relationship between compensation and leverage
in the pre- and post-crisis periods.
After the financial crisis, firms should be more cautious about financial risks as excessive
executive risk-taking is considered one reason for the crisis, and if executives take greater financial
risks, which is measured by leverage, they should be penalized with lower compensation.
Therefore, we would expect a stronger negative relation between leverage and compensation in
the post-crisis period. From this discussion, we developed the following group of hypotheses on
leverage and compensation relationship:
H3 (a): CEO total compensation is negatively associated with leverage in the pre-financial crisis
period.
H3 (b): CEO total compensation is negatively associated with leverage in the post-financial crisis
period.
H3

(c):

The association between CEO total compensation and leverage is stronger in the post-

financial crisis period.
3.4 Pay for Performance Sensitivity, Leverage and Compensation
According to agency theory, aligning CEO incentives with shareholder interests reduces the
agency problem. However, this in a highly leveraged firm might exacerbate conflicts between
shareholders and debtholders (John et al., 2010). Consequently, because of conflicting interests
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among stakeholders, tying compensation to stock performance may not always provide an optimal
solution. In fact, compensation tied to stock returns may create risk-shifting incentives for
managers. Because CEOs may take excessive risks which debtholders bear, in a leveraged firm
the debtholders can play a monitoring role and significantly influence the association between
CEO payment and stock performance. Thus, a firm’s leverage structure can influence the
compensation and stock-return relationship (pay for performance sensitivity).
John et al. (2010) argue and find that pay for performance sensitivity decreases with the
leverage ratio where debtholders work as a monitoring mechanism for the risk taking attitudes of
CEOs. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) document that risk-related complexity and pay for
performance sensitivity decreases significantly when a firm becomes financially distressed. OrtizMolina (2007) finds that pay–performance sensitivity decreases in straight-debt leverage, but it is
higher in firms with convertible debt. He argues that, to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts
of interest, firms trade-off shareholder-manager incentive alignment. John and John (1993) also
document a negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage. Because of
the previous evidence, we expect leverage to play a significant role on pay for performance
sensitivity in both pre- and post-crisis periods. However, whether the magnitude of the influence
of leverage on pay for performance sensitivity would be the same as it was in the pre- and postcrisis periods is for future investigation.
In the post-financial crisis period, distressed firms on the brink of collapse and financially
struggling institutions, which had been rescued through regulatory intervention, should have a
substantial portion of debt in their capital structure. It should, then, be a legitimate concern for
bondholders in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis to be more active about monitoring the managers’
risk-shifting incentives. This might result in a stronger role for leverage in mediating the sensitivity
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of pay for performance. In fact, the intensity of the conflicts between bondholders and shareholders
may create variations in the role of leverage on the sensitivity of pay for performance between the
pre- and post-crisis periods. The above discussion leads to the following set of hypotheses:
H4 (a): The sensitivity of the pay for performance is mediated by the leverage in the pre-financial
crisis period.
H4 (b): The sensitivity of the pay for performance is mediated by the leverage in the post-financial
crisis period.
H4 (c): The mediating role of leverage on pay for performance is stronger in the post-financial
crisis period.
4. Research Methodology
4.1. Sample and Data
We begin data collection using the COMPUSTAT database. All financial institutions are
included in the sample; SIC codes ranging from 6000 to 6799. The initial sample consists of 5,965
financial institutions with 39,407 firm-year observations for the period 2002 to 2013. We then
collect the stock returns data from the CRSP database. 22,742 first-year observations (3,456 firms)
are excluded for the missing values of the required financial variables and stock price data.
Collecting compensation information of the CEOs, we exclude 2,032 financial institutions and
13,089 firm-year observations for the unavailability of the compensation information, and merged
the data with the Execucomp database.
The final sample consists of 477 institutions and 3,575 firm-year observations, all of which
have the financial variables, stock returns and compensation related information. We define the
pre-crisis period as the five years from 2003 to 2007, which represented 443 financial institutions
and 1,460 firm-year observations. We exclude year 2008 in our analysis since this is the crisis
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year, and by doing so we reduce the bias in the regression results in the pre- and post-crisis period.
During the post-crisis period, from 2009 to 2013, the total number of firm-year observations was
1,750 of 380 institutions. Table 1, Panel A provides the sample selection procedure, and Panel B
shows the final sample in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
4.2. Model Specification
To test the hypotheses, we employee the multivariate regressions and conduct separate tests using
pre- and post-crisis data. We use lagged regressions for the explanatory variables since current
executive pay is based upon prior year’s performance. In the following model, the dependent
variable, CEO_Total_Compensation, is the total annual compensations for CEOs, which includes
salary, bonus and long-term compensations.
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡

In addition to test total compensations, we also examine the effects of firms’ economic
determinants on various components of the compensations, such as cash compensation (salary +
bonus), long-term compensation (long-term incentive + stock grant + options), and incentive
compensation (bonus + long-term compensation) in different analyses. The models for the
additional tests are as follows:
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡
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𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡

Our first explanatory variable is stock returns (Stock_Return). Stock_Return

t-1

is the

previous year’s average stock return of the company that captures the stock performance of the
firm. According to H1 (a) to H1 (c), we expect 𝛽1to be significantly positive, and the magnitude of
the coefficient would be significantly higher in the post-crisis period.
Our second interest variable is ROE. ROEt-1 is the prior year’s return on equity, calculated
as net income divided by stockholder equity. ROE is employed as a proxy for accounting
performance. According to the second sets of hypothesis, H2 (a) to H2 (c), we expect a significant
positive sign on 𝛽2 and the magnitude of the coefficient would be higher in the post-crisis period.
Leveraget-1 is the debt ratio of the previous year. Leveraget-1 is calculated as the prior year’s total
long-term debt divided by total assets. According to the third group of hypotheses, we expect a
negative coefficient for the Leverage variable both in pre- and post-crisis period, and the
coefficient 𝛽3 will be larger in post-crisis period. Other explanatory variables in the model are
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒t-1. 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is an interaction term between stock return
and leverage. A significant positive coefficient on 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 variable implies
that debt capital intensifies the association between stock return and executive compensation. A
negative significant coefficient implies that leverage reduces the pay for performance sensitivity,
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supporting the notion that debtholders play a monitoring role in overseeing the executive to ensure
fair risk-sharing. If the coefficient on 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is insignificant, we would not
expect any role of debtholders on pay for performance sensitivity in CEO contracting. According
to our predictions in H4, we expect a negative sign for the variable Stock_Return_Leverage both
in pre- and post-crisis period, and the negative relationship will be stronger in the post-crisis
period.
In addition to the four key explanatory variables, (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 , 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 ,
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 ), we also control for the growth and size of the firms.
The operational complexity of a high growth firm requires better skills, experience and talent,
which demands a higher payment in the optimal compensation contract. Therefore, the
compensation for CEOs would increase with the growth perspectives of the firm. Rosen (1981,
1982) argue that higher CEO talent is more valuable in larger high-growth companies, and larger
firms should offer higher levels of payment and be matched by more capable CEOs in an efficient
labor market. Gayle and Miller (2009) explain that the moral hazard problem is more severe for
larger firms, resulting in higher incentives for CEOs as the companies grow. Therefore, we control
for the growth and size of the firm in our regression, expecting a positive sign for both variables.
𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 is used as a control variable for capturing the influence of growth prospects of the
firm. 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 is estimated by the prior year’s total market capitalization divided by the book
value of the firm.
In order to control the effect of size on executive compensation, we include the variable
Size, which is determined by the log value of the lag total assets. Year dummies are used for
controlling any unobserved year-specific effects on compensation. To see if there is any significant
difference among the coefficients of the interest variables between these two periods, we run the
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same regression for both pre- and post-financial crisis periods. We expect differences among the
coefficients between pre- and post-financial crisis periods. An F-test would confirm the statistical
significance of the differences between the periods’ regression coefficients.
5. Sample Statistics and Empirical Results
5.1. Sample Distribution
Table 2 reports the sample distributions based on a three-digit SIC codes. Panel A in Table
2 shows that, the depository institution sector is the largest with 173 firms or 34%, followed by
holding and other investment firms with 112 firms or 23.65% and insurance carriers with 101 firms
or 23.2% respectively . Real estate is the smallest sector with 6 firms and 39 firm-year observations
for the years 2003 to 2013. Table 2, Panel A shows the average sales and net income distribution
of different financial sectors in our sample. On average, all financial institutions in our sample
show sales of $5.6 billion and net income of $460 million, respectively. Non-depository credit
institutions show the highest sales with $22.5 billion and net income of 824.8 million, from 2003
to 2013. Insurance carrier is the second largest sector, showing average sales of $9.7 billion.
Holding and other investment offices is the smallest sector, with average sales of $702 million.
Panel B in Table 2 shows the mean values of compensation amounts for each sector. As
per total compensation, the highest paid sector is the non-depository credit institutions where the
average yearly payment for CEOs is $12.96 million. The long-term equity incentive and bonus is
also highest with $12 million in this sector. The second highest paid sector is security and
commodity brokers / dealers, where the total compensation, long-term incentives and bonuses
average $10.7 million, $8.4 million, and $1.5 million, respectively. However, the average longterm incentive is higher in the insurance broker, agent and service sector. Interestingly, depository
institution is the lowest paid sector for both, total compensation and incentive compensation.
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[Insert Table 2 Here]
Table 3 reports annual mean compensations, stock price, ROE and sales of the full sample
for the years 2003 to 2013. Total compensation steadily increased in the earlier period of the
sample from 2003 to 2006. In 2003, average total compensation is $6.7 million, which is increased
to $8.8 million in 2006. Compensation somewhat decreases around the crisis period, and
immediately following the crisis, in 2009, the total average compensation is decreased to $3.8
million. The high growth in total compensation is due to the sharp increase in incentive
compensation. Long-term incentives increase rapidly from 2003 to 2006, decrease in 2008 and in
2009, and increase again in 2010 and 2011. The bonus compensation reduces substantially around
2008, the crisis year, and during the post-crisis period. In 2003, the average bonus is $1.5 million
but falls to $0.28 million in 2008. The bonus amount remains low after the crisis.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Figures 1 and 2 show the trends of compensation components and stock prices over the
study period and the sharp decline after the financial crisis in 2008 and followed by the stock price
crash. Figure 2 shows the comparative picture of the ROE, the total and different components of
the compensation. ROE declines sharply in 2008, yielding negative returns, on average, for the
financial sector. The compensation amounts also decrease significantly with poor firm
performance. These two figures vividly depict that there is a distinct relationship between CEO
compensation and firm accounting-based performance as well as stock market-based performance.
The trend of salary is relatively stable and consistent over the research periods.
[Insert Figure 1 and 2 Here]
Table 4, Panel A shows the weight of the different compensation components with respect
to total compensation over the periods studied. On average, salary accounts for 11.9% of total
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compensation and bonuses for 10.2%, while long-term compensation is 77.9% of total CEO pay.
Panel A shows that the percentage of salary in total compensation slightly increases over the
period. The table also shows that the proportion of the bonus is 23.6% in 2003 and that it decreases
significantly over the period, yielding only 4.35% of total compensation in 2012. Following the
financial crisis, firms followed more rigid policies regarding bonus payment. In 2008-2009, the
proportion of long-term compensation decreases immediately after the financial crisis but begins
to increase again in 2010. Panel B shows that overall, the proportion of long-term compensation
increased in the post-crisis period, although the change is not statistically significant for long-term
compensation. An interesting finding is that the fraction of bonus payments in total compensation
shrinks substantially in the post-crisis period, and a t-test confirms the statistical significance of
the reduction in bonuses.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all variables for the period 2003-2013.
The mean salary for the financial service sector is $0.744 million. The mean bonus and long-term
compensation is $0.64 million and $5.1 million, respectively. The mean cash compensation (salary
+ bonus) is $1.3 million whereas the mean incentive compensation (bonus + long-term incentive
+ stock grants) is $5.7 million. One interesting observation in Panel A is the highly skewed
distribution for bonuses. The data distribution shows that the first quartile and median value of the
bonus is 0, which means that the majority of firms did not pay bonuses. The mean value of the
bonus, $0.639 million, is derived from the one-fourth sample of the top quartile firms that pay
large bonuses to their CEOs. The skewed distribution is also observed for long-term compensation.
The median value of the long-term compensation is $1.9 million whereas the mean value of it is
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$5.1 million. The size of the firms in terms of total assets has a mean and median value of $5.6
billion and $874 million. The relatively high mean value of firm size is influenced by the presence
of a few large firms in the sample. The mean, median and standard deviation of the ROE is 4%,
10% and 2.03, respectively. The average market to book ratio is 1.67. The mean value of leverage
is 0.89 whereas the median is 0.53 and the third quartile value is 1.24. This distribution implies
that some firms are highly leveraged, and at least one quarter of the sample has negative equity.
Table 5, Panel B shows the mean differences and their statistical significance of all tested
variables between the pre- and post-financial crisis period. Except for the size of the firm, the mean
values of all variables differ significantly for the same period. Except for salaries, all other
compensation components including total compensation decreases significantly in the post crisis
period. Stock price, ROE, market to book ratio and leverage ratio are lower in the post-crisis period
than those of pre-crisis period, and the t-test confirms that these differences between pre- and postcrisis periods are statistically significant.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
5.3 Correlation Matrix and Results of Lagged Regression Analysis
Table 6 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for all variables. Panel A and B shows the
correlation matrix for the pre- and post-financial periods. In both Panel A and B, Salary is
positively correlated with cash compensation, long-term and total compensation. There is no
relation between salary and ROE, market to book and leverage, in the pre-crisis period. However,
salary is negatively correlated with ROE and market to book in the post-crisis periods. Bonuses
are positively correlated with size, ROE and stock returns in both the pre- and post-crisis periods.
The correlation between long-term compensation and stock return is positive in both the pre- and
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post-crisis periods. However, there is no correlation between long-term compensation and ROE
for the pre-crisis period.
In Panel A, leverage is positively correlated with total compensation. However, the
correlation between leverage and total compensation is not significant in Panel B. Stock return is
positively correlated with ROE for both the pre- and post-crisis periods. For the pre-crisis period,
market to book ratio is correlated only with ROE. However, correlations between market to book,
and salary and bonus are negative in the post-crisis period.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Table 7 shows the multivariate lagged regression results. In Table 7, the dependent variable
is the total compensation. In column one, the regression results for the pre-financial crisis period
show that all the firm-specific economic factors included in the regression model considerably
influence CEO compensation. The coefficients of stock return and ROE are significantly and
positively associated with total compensation, which support H1 (a) and H2 (a). In the pre-crisis
period, the values of the coefficients for Stock_Return, ROE and Mkt_to_Book are 0.373, 0.381
and 0.029 with t-stat values of 7.83, 3.1 and 2.97, respectively. In the pre-crisis period, leverage is
positively associated with total compensation, which contradicts our prediction in H3 (a).
In Table 7 (pre-crisis column), the coefficient of Stock_Ret_Leverage is -0.158 with t-stat
-3.05. The significant negative coefficient on Stock_Ret_Leverage variable provides strong
support for H4 (a), i.e., that leverage negatively influences the pay for performance sensitivity.
Total compensation is positively related to the size of the firm, which is consistent with previous
literature. Overall, the first column shows that total compensation in the pre-crisis period is
significantly determined by firm-specific economic factors, including company size, ROE , stock
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performance and leverage. Unlike other studies, our study shows the adjusted R2 for regression at
40.67%, which indicates a very high explanatory power of our model.
Table 7 also shows the regression results for the post-crisis period. The results indicate that
during the post-crisis period, total compensation is determined primarily by stock-returns that
supports H1 (b). The coefficient value is 0.416 and t-stat is 12.150, which implies that, if
Stock_Return increases by one standard deviation, a CEO’s total compensation will increase
approximately 0.4 % percent (0.416 * 59.97/5,885.06 = 0.42%). In post-crisis period, there is no
significant relationship between total compensation and ROE. Therefore, we fail to support H2
(b). However, we find that in the post-financial crisis period, leverage and total compensation are
significantly and positively associated, which is contradictory with our prediction in H3(b). The
correlation coefficient on Stock_Ret_Leverage is -0.012 (t-stat = 1.835) which implies that
leverage reduces the pay for performance sensitivity. Overall, we present evidence that in the postcrisis period, total compensation is determined primarily by stock returns and leverage. Thus, we
find support for H1 (b) and H4 (b) in the post crisis period. However, the relationship between
leverage and total compensation is somewhat inconsistent with our prediction. We find a positive
relationship between leverage and compensation. An alternative explanation of this positive
relationship is that in a highly leveraged firm, managers face higher risk and greater operational
complexity. As a result, CEOs may demand higher compensation as their tasks become more
challenging with increased financial risk.
In accordance with our comparative hypothesis, we found that the role of firm economic
factors in determining executive compensation is not the same in the pre- and post-crisis periods.
For further analysis, we conduct F-tests for checking the statistical differences of the coefficients
between the pre- and post-crisis periods and find that the pay for performance sensitivity is higher
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in the latter. The coefficient value for Leverage and Stock_Ret_Leverage significantly decreases
from the pre- to post-crisis period, supporting H 4 (c). The p-values for the F-test for both of these
variables between the pre- and post-crisis periods are <0.001. The adjusted R2 for the regression
model in the post-financial crisis period is 33.73%. However, when we conduct the F-test, we do
not find any significant differences for Stock_Return and Leverage coefficients between the preand post-crisis periods.
The findings of our study regarding the associations between total compensation and firm
performance variable are consistent with the literature. For example, Chalmers et al. (2006),
Vemala (2014), and John and Qian (2010) report significant positive association between firm size
and compensation and the coefficient value ranges from 0.28 to 0.44. In our study, the coefficient
value is 0.476 in the pre-crisis period and 0.40 in the post-crisis period. By using pre-financial
crisis data, Chamlers et al. (2006) finds a significant positive association (coefficient value =
0.017) between and total compensation. Our analysis also show a significant positive coefficient
for Mkt_to _Book, a value 0.029 in the pre-crisis period and 0.006 in the post crisis period.
Although we expected a negative coefficient for leverage, the results show a significant positive
coefficient in the total compensation regression model. One possible explanation of the positive
coefficient is that highly leveraged firms are more likely to be complex and risky, which requires
highly-skilled executives, who may demand higher compensation.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
5.4 Results of Additional Tests
The dependent variable in Table 8, Panel A shows the results of cash compensation, which
is the sum of the salary and the bonus. In this table, we observe that in the pre-crisis period, ROE
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is significantly and negatively associated with cash compensation, whereas in the post-crisis period
cash compensation is determined by both stock returns and ROE. The coefficient on
Stock_Ret_Leverage is not significant in any of the models in Panel A. The adjusted R2 dropped
noticeably in the post-crisis period.
[Insert Table 8 Panel A Here]
Table 8, Panel B shows the relationship between the total incentive compensation (bonus
+ long-term compensation) and the firm economic performance variables. Overall, it shows that
there is no significant difference of this relationship between the pre- and post-crisis period except
for the Mkt_to_Book ratio. In both periods, total incentive compensation is determined by
Stock_Ret, ROE and Size. These variables are positively associated with total incentive
compensation. In pre-crisis period, Mkt_to_Book is significantly and positively related to incentive
compensation, however, there is no association between these two variables in the post-crisis
period. In both periods, Stock_Ret_Leverage is significantly and negatively associated with the
incentive compensation but the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller in the post-crisis period.
The adjusted R2 for the model are 32.15% and 33.50% in the pre- and post-crisis period
accordingly.
[Insert Table 8 Panel B Here]
Table 8, Panel C shows the regression results of long-term compensation for both the preand post-financial crisis periods. In this table, the dependent variable is long-term compensation,
which includes all long-term incentive plans, stock grants and option-related compensation. Longterm compensation is significantly and positively associated by size, stock return and ROE in both
the pre- and post-crisis periods. One notable difference between the two periods is the relationship
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between leverage and long-term compensation. There is no association between these two in the
pre-crisis period, but leverage positively influences long-term compensation in the post-crisis
period. Our last variable of interest in the model is Stock_Ret_Leverage, which determines the role
of leverage on pay for stock market performance sensitivity. According to our predictions, we find
a negative association between compensation and Stock_Ret_Leverage in this model. However, a
further F-test confirms that the statistical and economic significance of the coefficient on
Stock_Ret_Leverage is lower in the post-financial crisis period, which suggests that the influence
of bondholders on the incentive system, and especially on compensation for stock performance, is
reduced in the post-crisis period, which is contradictory with H4 (c).
[Insert Table 8 Panel C Here]
6. Summary, Conclusions and Implications
This study examines the role of economic performance in determining executive compensation
and what, if any, changes occurred in the post-financial crisis period. Using data from 477 US
financial institutions we find that the mean of CEOs’ total compensation during the post-crisis
period of our study is significantly lower compared to the mean total compensation of the precrisis period. However, the overall trend in the post-crisis period shows upward movements of
total and incentive compensation spanning years. The evidence suggests that CEO compensation
and the risk-attitude of the firms has not significantly changed even after the financial crisis.
Therefore, the board of directors, especially the compensation committee, should be careful in
monitoring firm performance and determining executive compensation.
Our analysis also finds that, in the pre-crisis period, total compensation is determined
mostly by accounting-based performance, stock returns, and the firms’ leverage. However, in the
post-crisis period, there is no association between total compensation and accounting-based
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performance of the firms. We also find that the pay for performance sensitivity is significantly
reduced by the influence of leverage. However, the role of leverage in mediating the pay for
performance sensitivity in the post crisis period is lower than in the pre-crisis period. As additional
tests, we perform the same analysis for different components of the compensation, and document
notable differences between the pre- and post-crisis period with respect to those economic factors
in determining different components of CEO compensation.
The aim of our paper is to examine the impact of economic determinants of executive
compensation in the pre- and post-financial crisis eras and to conduct a comparative analysis on
those economic determinants. To conduct the comparative analysis, we consider five years before
and five years after the financial crisis of 2008. Overall, the study’s results reveal significant
changes in the economic determinants of CEO compensation in the post-financial crisis period.
We introduce the Dodd-Frank Act into the discussion of our post-crisis analysis because the Act
was passed in response to financial crisis, and was intended to create major changes in the financial
service institutions’ regulatory aspects. However, the years 2009-2013—the post-crisis period in
our study—combine the pre- and post-Dodd-Frank eras. The Act, signed in 2010, came into effect
in 2011. Still, not all of the Act’s provisions are in place even now and some are subject to change.
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude within our limited analysis whether the Dodd-Frank Act is
successful in making the compensation contract more optimal. Nonetheless, granting additional
monitoring mechanisms to shareholders and the requirements of the Act may have caused some
changes that we observed in the post-crisis period. Further research is needed to gain deeper
insights into what occurred and to explore those factors that contribute to the long-term
sustainability of financial service companies. In future, it would also be interesting to explore other
determinants of executive compensation (such as corporate governance variables, including board
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of director composition), CEO-specific variables (such as CEO tenure, CEO power, corporate
social responsibilities, and other non-financial factors), and to examine whether the influence of
these factors in determining compensation have changed from the pre-crisis to post-crisis period.
The findings of our study would be a great interest to the board of directors and managers.
Especially it should be beneficial to the compensation committee in determining an optimal
contract for the managers that would be properly aligned with corporate goals. Regulators and
shareholders should be aware of the trends and compensations structures of the firms between the
pre- and post-crisis period. Regulators should further examine whether additional regulations are
required to discipline the market and executive incentive system.
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Table 1 Panel A: Sample Selection Process

Database and Sample Selection

No. of Financial
Institutions

No. of
Observations

All financial institutions (SIC code from 6000 to
6999) from the COMPUSTAT database for the year
2002 to 2013

5,965

39,407

(3,456)

(22,743)

2,509

16,664

(2,032)

(13,089)

477

3,575

Data excluded for missing values of the financial
variables and for creating lag variables
COMPUSTAT data for the year 2003 to 2013 with
all required financial variables
Data excluded for missing values after merging with
the EXECUCOMP database
Sample with all financial variables and CEO
compensations data for the year 2003 to 2013

Table 1 Panel B: No. of Financial Institution and Observation during Pre-Crisis,
Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods

Year

No. of Financial
Institutions

No. of
Observation

Pre-Crisis

2003 – 2007

443

1,460

Financial Crisis

2008

365

365

Post-Crisis

2009 - 2013

380

1,750
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Table 2, Panel A: Sample Distribution by 3-Digits-SIC, Sales and Net Income Mean Values for the Year 2003 to 2013

SIC_3_Digit

Industry Categories

No. of
Financial
Institutions
173

No. of

Percentage of

Sales

Net Income

Observation

Observation

($ million)

($ million)

1,230

34%

4,405.3

576.5

6000 - 6099

Depository Institutions

6100 – 6199

Non-Depository Credit Institutions

20

152

4.3%

22,786.2

824.8

6200 – 6299

Security and Commodity Brokers and Dealers

49

385

10.8%

5,870.9

656.6

6300 – 6399

Insurance Carriers

101

829

23.2%

9,762.8

521.7

6400 – 6499

Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service

16

95

2.7%

3,284.6

276.1

6500 – 6599

Real Estate

6

39

1.1%

2,638.2

95.2

6700 – 6799

Holding and other Investment Offices

112

845

23.6%

702.7

115.0

5,657.9

460.56

477

3,575

100%
15845.7

3532.1

Mean Value
Std. Dev
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Table 2, Panel B: Sample Distribution by 3-Digits-SIC and CEO Compensation Means for the Year 2003 to 2013

6000 - 6099

Depository Institutions

173

760.8

378.0

Long-Term and
Equity Incentive
($ thousand)
3,077.4

6100 - 6199

Non-Depository Credit Institutions

20

861.2

1,728.6

10,375.5

12,965.3

6200 - 6299

Security and Commodity Brokers and Dealers

49

653.4

1,594.9

8,472.8

10,725.3

6300 - 6399

Insurance Carriers

101

888.9

711.0

6,666.3

8,266.2

6400 - 6499

Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service

16

795.8

258.0

7,165.7

8,219.5

6500 - 6599

Real Estate

6

809.5

218.9

4,764.4

5,792.8

6700 - 6799

Holding and other Investment Offices

112

590.1

381.8

3,984.7

4,959.4

744.3

639.6

5,143.9

6,529.9

394.3

1,791.6

11,183.51

11,844.6

SIC_3_Digit

Industry Categories

No. of
Institutions

Salary
($ thousand)

Bonus
($ thousand)

Mean Value

Total
Compensation
($ thousand)
4,217.5

477
Std. Dev
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Table 3: Year-Wise Mean Compensation and Stock Price

Year

No. of
Observation

Total
Compensation
($ thousand)

Long-Term and
Equity Incentive
($ thousand)

Bonus
($ thousand)

Salary
($ thousand)

Stock
Price
($)

2003

248

6,726.4

4,426.1

1,586.8

713.5

2004

250

7,563.0

5,384.7

1,455.4

2005

268

8,761.5

6,386.2

2006

317

8,881.8

2007

377

2008

ROE

Sales
($ million)

34.3

0.1396

5,553.93

722.9

40.0

0.1116

5,601.77

1,647.1

728.2

41.5

0.1378

6,274.77

7,481.9

694.7

689.5

43.3

0.1464

6,332.14

7,058.5

5,885.6

494.5

678.4

40.8

0.1444

5,915.97

365

4,578.2

3,606.7

280.0

689.8

28.3

-0.3209

4,468.79

2009

359

3,848.7

2,791.5

331.8

723.4

32.3

-0.0621

5,032.06

2010

357

5,885.7

4,716.0

365.0

804.7

33.0

0.0229

5,645.27

2011

348

5,784.3

4,678.7

295.3

810.2

32.2

0.0616

5,724.57

2012

344

7,286.6

6,170.8

310.8

805.0

33.0

0.0888

5,950.66

2013

342

6,708.8

5,550.7

350.7

807.4

41.5

0.0844

Mean Value

325

6,529.9

5,143.9

639.6

744.3

36.14

0.04

5,961.06
5678.272

Std. Dev

47.46

11,844.6

11,183.51

1,791.6

394.3

59.97

2.03

538.4237
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Figure 1: Year-Wise Mean Compensation and Stock Price
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Table 4, Panel A: Year-Wise Weight of Different Components of Compensation
Year

No. of
Observation

Salary

Bonus

Long-Term
Incentive

2003

248

10.6%

23.6%

66%

2004

250

9.6%

19.2%

71%

2005

268

8.3%

18.8%

73%

2006

317

7.8%

7.8%

84%

2007

377

9.6%

7.0%

83%

2008

365

15.1%

6.1%

79%

2009

359

18.8%

8.6%

73%

2010

357

13.7%

6.2%

80%

2011

348

14.0%

5.1%

81%

2012

344

11.0%

4.3%

85%

2013

342

12.0%

5.2%

83%

Mean

325

11.9%

10.2%

77.9%

Std. Dev

47.46

3.3%

6.9%

6.3%

Table 4 Panel B: Mean Difference of the Weight of Different Components of the
Compensation between Pre- and Post-Crisis Period
Long-Term and

Period

Salary

Bonus

Pre-Crisis (N = 1,460)

9.10%

15.08%

75.82%

Post-Crisis (N = 1,750)

13.39%

5.60%

80.96%

Difference (Pre-Post)

-4.29%

9.48%

-5.14%

-2.73***

4.69***

-1.21

t-Stat
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Equity Incentive

Table 5 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables from 2003 to 2013
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev

Q1

Median

Q3

Salary ($, thousand)

3575

744.32

394.32

500.00

711.02

950.00

Bonus ($, thousand)

3575

639.63

1,791.55

0.00

0.00

500.00

Cash_Comp ($, thousand)

3575

1,383.95

1,883.70

600.00

876.75

1,330.00

Long_Term_Comp ($, thousand)

3575

5,143.96

11,183.51

495.60

1,900.03

5,403.94

Incentive_Comp ($, thousand)

3575

5,784.71

11,738.71

773.64

2,310.29

6,150.89

Total_Comp ($, thousand)

3575

6,529.88

11,844.61

1,405.85

3,092.86

7,069.87

Stock_Price ($)

3575

36.14

59.97

16.77

28.37

44.05

Size ($, million)

3575

5,657.97

15,845.67

332.81

874.67

3,339.82

ROE

3575

0.04

2.03

0.05

0.10

0.15

Mkt_to_Book

3575

1.67

26.93

1.07

1.55

2.27

Leverage

3575

0.89

6.69

0.21

0.53

1.24
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Table 5 Panel B: Mean Difference of the Variables between Pre- and Post-Crisis Period

Pre-Crisis

Post-Crisis

Mean

(2003 to 2007)

(2009 to 2013)

Difference

N = 1,460

N = 1,750

(Pre-Post)

Mean

Mean

Salary ($, thousand)

703.55

789.71

-86.17

-5.07***

Bonus ($, thousand)

1,099.61

330.88

768.73

6.04***

Cash_Comp ($, thousand)

1,803.16

1,120.60

682.56

10.01***

Long_Term_Comp ($, thousand)

5,985.28

4,764.01

1,221.27

2.99***

Incentive_Comp ($, thousand)

7,088.32

5,095.08

1,993.24

4.65***

Total_Comp ($, thousand)

7,793.25

5,885.06

1,908.19

4.41***

Stock_Price ($)

40.24

34.36

5.88

2.66***

Size ($, million)

5,956.64

5,656.99

299.65

ROE

0.14

0.04

0.10

4.05***

Mkt_to_Book

2.60

1.73

0.87

3.78***

Leverage

1.15

0.76

0.38

2.61***

Variable

44

t-Stat

0.521

Table 6, Panel A: Correlation Matrix (Pre-Crisis Period, 2003 to 2007)
Variables

Salary

Bonus

Cash_
Comp

Long_
Term_
Comp

Incentive
_Comp

Total_
Comp

Stock_
Return

Size

ROE

Mkt_to_
Book

Salary
Bonus
Cash_Comp
Long_Term_Comp
Incentive_Comp
Total_Comp
Stock_ Return
Size
ROE
Mkt_to_Book
Leverage

0.442***
0.588***

0.895***

0.437***

0.388***

0.359***

0.487***

0.682***

0.597***

0.874***

0.598***

0.681***

0.654***

0.857***

0.953***

0.251***

0.308***

0.313***

0.369***

0.424***

0.451***

0.588***

0.603***

0.599***

0.467***

0.554***

0.622***

0.453***

0.037

0.154***

0.053*

0.022

0.066**

0.058**

0.090***

0.065***

-0.008

-0.022

-0.014

-0.002

-0.002

-0.000

0.011

-0.003

0.829***

0.01419

0.093***

0.056**

0.036

0.044*

0.054**

0.023

0.093***

0.392***
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0.295***

Table 6, Panel B: Correlation Matrix (Post-Crisis, 2009 to 2013)

Variables

Salary

Bonus

Cash_
Comp

Long_
Term_
Comp

Incentive
_Comp

Total_
Comp

Stock_
Return

Size

ROE

Mkt_to_
Book

Salary
Bonus
Cash_Comp
Long_Term_Comp
Incentive_Comp
Total_Comp
Stock_ Return
Size
ROE
Mkt_to_Book
Leverage

0.358***
0.850***

0.805***

0.310***

0.371***

0.283***

0.329***

0.639***

0.402***

0.936***

0.499***

0.618***

0.541***

0.894***

0.944***

0.121***

0.219***

0.170***

0.438***

0.467***

0.429***

0.305***

0.377***

0.290***

0.502***

0.522***

0.532***

0.27***

-0.039*

0.002

-0.022

0.077***

0.097***

0.063***

0.128***

0.024

-0.050**

-0.080*

-0.036

0.017

0.026

0.011

0.100***

-0.083*

0.095*

-0.0394

-0.094**

-0.024

-0.034

-0.026

-0.029

0.084***

-0.083***

-0.439***

46

0.268***

Table 7: Multiple Lagged Regression of CEO Total Compensation
Dependent Variable = Total Compensation
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡

Pre-Crisis (2003 to 2007)
Expected
Variables

Parameter

t-Value

Pr > |t|

Sign

Intercept

Post-Crisis (2009 to 2013)
Expected

Parameter

t-Value

Pr > |t|

4.192

48.180

<.0001

Sign
3.820

24.110

<.0001

Lag_Stock_ Ret

+

0.373

7.830

<.0001

+

0.416

12.150

<.0001

Lag_ROE

+

0.381

3.100

0.002

+

0.017

1.570

0.115

Lag_Leverage

-

0.217

3.050

0.002

-

0.024

2.170

0.030

Lag_Stock_Ret_Leverage

-

-0.158

-3.050

0.002

-

-0.012

-1.835

0.071

Lag_Mkt_to_Book

+

0.029

2.970

0.003

+

0.006

0.790

0.429

Lag_Size

+

0.411

23.400

<.0001

+

0.320

22.540

<.0001

Adjusted R2
N

40.67%

33.73%

1460

1750

F-test values for equality of coefficients between the pre- and post-crisis period:
Lag_Leverage (p-value = 0.027), Lag_Stock_Ret_Leverage (p-value < 0.001)
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Table 8 Panel A: Additional Tests: Multiple Regression of CEO Cash Compensation
Dependent Variable = Cash Compensation (Salary + Bonus)
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑡

Pre-Crisis (2003 to 2007)
Expected
Variables

Parameter

t-Value

Pr > |t|

Sign

Intercept

Post-Crisis (2009 to 2013)
Expected

Parameter

t-Value

Pr > |t|

5.549

56.250

<.0001

Sign

4.966

37.570

<.0001

Lag_Stock_Ret

+

-0.030

-0.770

0.439

+

0.062

2.640

0.008

Lag_ROE

+

0.167

1.890

0.058

+

0.050

2.050

0.040

Lag_Leverage

-

0.001

0.010

0.991

-

0.006

0.610

0.542

Lag_Stock_Ret_Lev

-

-0.001

-0.060

0.951

-

-0.003

-0.690

0.489

Lag_Mkt_to_Book

+

0.007

0.940

0.345

+

-0.003

-1.030

0.302

Lag_Size

+

0.306

24.150

<.0001

+

0.148

11.510

<.0001

Adjusted R2
N

34.26%

9.36%

1460

1750

F-test values for equality of coefficients between the pre- and post-crisis period: ROE (p-value = 0.016)
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Table 8 Panel B: Additional Test: Multiple Regression of CEO Total Incentive Compensation
Dependent Variable = Total Incentive Compensation (Bonus + Long-Term Compensation)
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡

Pre-Crisis (2003 to 2007)
Expected
Variables

Lag_Stock_ Ret

+

Lag_ROE

+

Lag_Leverage

-

Lag_Stock_Ret_Lev

-

Lag_Mkt_to_Book

+

Lag_Size

+

N

t-Value

Pr > |t|

Expected

Sign

Intercept

Adjusted R2

Parameter

Post-Crisis (2009 to 2013)
Parameter

t-Value

Pr > |t|

3.306

21.900

<.0001

0.506

14.070

<.0001

0.077

2.050

0.041

-0.004

-0.370

0.710

-0.004

-2.010

0.045

-0.004

-0.960

0.335

0.400

20.850

<.0001

Sign

2.741

12.300

<.0001

0.425

6.300

<.0001

0.528

2.970

0.003

-0.018

-1.120

0.262

-0.035

-3.200

0.001

0.036

2.500

0.012

0.476

19.250

<.0001

+
+
+
+

32.15%

33.50%

1460

1750

F-test values for equality of coefficients between the pre- and post-crisis period:
ROE (p-value < 0.001), Lag_Stock_Ret_Leverage (p-value < 0.001), Lag_Mkt_to_Book (p-value < 0.001)

49

Table 8 Panel C: Additional Test: Multiple Regression of CEO Long-term Compensation
Dependent Variable = Long-Term Compensation (Long-Term Incentive + Stock Grants + Options)
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝑡𝑜_𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡

Pre-Crisis (2003 to 2007)
Expected
Variables

Parameter

t-Value

Pr > |t|

Post-Crisis (2009 to 2013)
Expected

Sign

Intercept

Parameter

t-Value

Pr > |t|

3.299

21.920

<.0001

Sign

2.663

11.750

<.0001

Lag_Stock_ Ret

+

0.434

6.430

<.0001

+

0.583

13.260

<.0001

Lag_ROE

+

0.510

2.870

0.004

+

0.010

2.650

0.008

Lag_Leverage

-

0.165

1.630

0.102

-

0.037

2.170

0.030

Lag_Stock_Ret_Lev

-

-0.046

-4.130

<.0001

-

-0.004

-3.270

0.001

Lag_Mkt_to_Book

+

0.032

2.250

0.024

+

-0.001

-0.030

0.979

Lag_Size

+

0.481

19.340

<.0001

+

0.414

21.110

<.0001

Adjusted R2
N

32.25%

38.87%

1460

1750

F-test values for equality of coefficients between the pre- and post-crisis period:
ROE (p-value < 0.001), Lag_Stock_Ret_Leverage (p-value < 0.001)
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